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I. INTRODUCTION
Android has become the most popular mobile phone oper-
ating system over the last three years. There are thousands
of applications emerging every day. As of May 2013, 48
billion apps have been installed from the Google Play store,
and as of September 3, 2013, 1 billion Android devices have
been activated1. Meanwhile, the Android operating system also
becomes a worthwhile target for security and privacy attacks.
A major problem in Android is private data leaks. A lot of
data leaks have been reported these years, such as passive
content leaks [?] which cause affected applications to passively
disclose in-application data and capability leaks which analyze
the reachability of a dangerous permission from a public and
unguarded interface.
Many privacy leaks present in Android are the result of
interactions among application components which are the basic
units to build Android applications. However, on Android
no direct code connection exists between two components.
To bridge this gap, we present a tool named IccMatcher
which uses path matching algorithm to detect inter-component
communication (ICC) based leaks. IccMatcher is built on top
of Flowdroid [3], a tool performing single component static
taint analysis and Epicc [4] , a tool for finding ICC links among
components. Both Epicc and Flowdroid leverage the Soot
framework [5] which uses the Dexpler plugin [6] to convert
Android Dalvik bytecode to Soot’s internal representation
called Jimple.
Flowdroid uses a static taint analysis, a kind of data flow
analysis, to keep track values derived from sensitive data. It
first labels the private data that we call source (for instance
a method returning GPS coordinate), and then track the data
by statically analyzing the code. If the private data reaches a
method that sends it outside the app, also called sink method,
we identify this as a private data leak and we tag the path from
the source to the sink as a detected tainted path.
II. ICC PROBLEM
Some specific Android system methods are used to trigger
component communication. We call them ICC methods. The
most used ICC method is the startActivity method for
starting a new Activity.
There are four types of components: a) Activity, represent-
ing the user interface; b) Service, executing tasks in back-
ground; c) Broadcast Receiver, receiving messages from other
components or the system; and d) Content Provider, acting
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android (operating system)
as the standard interface to share structured data between
applications. Components use Intent to communicate between
one another. All ICC methods take at least one Intent as their
parameter. Intents can also encapsulate data and thus transfer
data between two components.
Let us consider Listing 1 as an example. Two activi-
ties FirstActivity and SecondActivity are defined
and they use the startActivity ICC method to com-
municate. FirstActivity contains one source method,
getDeviceId, which returns the unique device ID (e.g., the
IMEI for GSM and the MEID or ESN for CSMA phones). We
consider the device id as sensitive data. SecondActivity
contains one sink method, Log.i, which logs data to disk.
Neither FirstActivity nor SecondActivity contains
a tainted path. However, it does exist one data leak from source
method getDeviceId in FirstActivity to sink method
Log.i in SecondActivity.
1 class FirstActivity {
2 void onCreate(Bundle state) {
3 String id = telMnger.getDeviceId();
4 Intent i = new Intent(this,
SecondActivity.class);
5 i.putExtra("sensitive", id);
6 this.startActivity(i); }}
7 class SecondActivity {
8 void onCreate(Bundle state) {
9 Intent i = getIntent();
10 String s = i.getStringExtra("sensitive");
11 Log.i("GRSRD2014", s); }}
Listing 1. An example code about crossing component data leaks
Static analyses usually rely on call graphs. However, in
Android applications the mechanism of components makes that
no direct code connection exists between two components[1].
This means one component cannot be reached from another
component in the call graph. We refer to this as the ICC
Problem.
III. PATH MATCHING ALGORITHM
In this section, we present a path matching algorithm able
to detect ICC based privacy leaks between two components.
In order to solve the ICC problem, we define four varieties of
sources or sinks:
• real-sources are methods that return sensitive data of
the application (or Android System).
• real-sinks are methods that send at least one sensitive
data outside the application.
• bridge-sources are entry point methods of a compo-
nent that can be started and receive data from another
component.
• bridge-sinks are ICC methods which are able to
start and send data to another component, e.g.,
startService.
Algorithm 1 presents our matching algorithm to detect ICC
based privacy leaks. The inputs are 1) ICC links, a set of
ICC links which connect two components, computed by Epicc;
2) IPC (Inter-Procedure Communication) paths, a set of IPC
paths which starts with a source method and ends with a sink
method within a component. 3) SourceAndSink containing sets
for real-sources, real-sinks, bridge-sources and bridge-sinks
methods. The algorithm first builds an ICC graph (line 7).
Then it checks all the IPC paths to mark the corresponding
component node in the ICC graph with start if the path ends
with a bridge sink or end if the path starts with a bridge source
(lines 8-15). Finally, It traverses the marked ICC graph to
detect ICC based paths (lines 16-23). For all edges in the ICC
graph, if the source node is marked as start and the destination
node is marked as end, an ICC based privacy leak is detected.
Algorithm 1 ICC based privacy leak detection algorithm
1: procedure DETECTICCBASEDPRIVACYLEAKS
2: links← ICClinks
3: paths← IPCpaths
4: sas← SourceAndSink
5: iccPaths← empthSet
6: start← start marker, end← end marker
7: graph← buildICCGraph(links)
8: for path in paths do
9: if path.first ∈ sas.bridgeSource then
10: markICCPath(graph, path, end)
11: end if
12: if path.last ∈ sas.bridgeSink then
13: markICCPath(graph, path, start)
14: end if
15: end for
16: for node in graph do
17: children← getChildNodes(graph, node)
18: for childNode in children do
19: if node.hasStart & childNode.hasEnd then
20: iccPaths.add(node.start, childNode.end)
21: end if
22: end for
23: end for
24: return iccPaths
25: end procedure
Figure 1 shows the result of applying our path matching
algorithm on the code of Listing 1. First, Epicc computes
an ICC link from FirstActivity to SecondActivity.
Then, Flowdroid computes an IPC path from getDeviceId
method to startActivity method in FirstActivity
and a IPC path from getIntent method to Log.i method
in SecondActivity. Finally, we run our matching al-
gorithm to build the ICC graph. The left node represents
FirstActivity and we mark it as start since it contains
an IPC path ending with a bridge-sink method. The right node
represents SecondActivity and we mark it as end since it
String id = telMnger.getDeviceId()
Intent i = new Intent(this, SecondActivity.class)
i.putExtra("sensitive", id)
this.startActivity(i)
Intent i = getIntent()
String s = i.getStringExtra("sensitive") 
Log.i("EXAMPLE", s)
FirstActivity SecondActivity
real-source
real-sink bridge-sink
bridge-sourcestart marker
end marker
Fig. 1. Marked ICC graph of our motivating example listed in Listing 1
contains an IPC path starting with a bridge-source method. The
two nodes’ marker match so there is one ICC based privacy
leak between FirstActivity and SecondActivity.
One special ICC method, startActivityForResult,
exists in Android system. It starts another component and
then waits for it to finish. Once the other component fin-
ishes, it continues running with the result returned from the
other component. Because it has more complicated semantics
compared to common ICC methods that only trigger one-
way communication between components, we handle them
specifically. IV. CASE STUDY
InsecureBank2 is a vulnerable Android application
created by Paladion Inc. specifically for the purpose
of evaluating privacy leak detection tools. Flowdroid
finds all seven data leaks (within component) without
any false positives nor false negatives. We ran our path
matching algorithm based tool IccMatcher on InsecureBank,
and we find a privacy leak crossing two components
from com.android.insecurebank.LoginScreen
to com.android.insecurebank.PostLogin. In
LoginScreen, a password is obtained from EditText
and is stored into an Intent which is sent to PostLogin
by the ICC method startActivity. In PostLogin,
the password is sent outside InsecureBank through the
postHttpContent method.
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